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Citizenship, entitlement and autochthonic political projects of belonging in the 
age of Brexit 
 
Nira Yuval-Davis, University of East London & Ulrike M Vieten, Queen’s University Belfast 
 
Abstract: 
The chapter examines some of the reasons’ different sections of the British society, 
particularly in England and in Wales, have voted for Brexit and link it with recent 
developments with the ways people and governments are being engaged in racialized 
political projects of belonging. The overall argument is that Brexit should be analysed 
in the context of people and governments’ reactions to the global and local double crisis 
of governability and governmentality. The recent rise of populist politics among British 
people, including some of its racialized minorities, needs to be seen on the background 
of the British 2014 & 2016 Immigration Acts which established ‘everyday bordering’ 
as primary technology of controlling diversity and discourses on diversity, undermining 
convivial pluralist multi-cultural social relations. In these processes, border guarding is 
added to citizenship duties, and the boundaries of social rights are being shifted from 
the boundaries of civil society towards the boundaries of political citizenship. 
Introduction: 
The majority vote of the British people to leave the European Union in summer 2016 
(‘Brexit’) has caught almost everyone by surprise – the stock market that bet on the UK 
remaining in the EU, the British government – as well as the Labour opposition - which 
did not even bother to prepare contingency plans in case of Brexit and even the leaders 
of the Brexit camp, like Nigel Farage and Boris Johnson prepared their defeat speeches 
rather than that of their unforeseen success.  
A thorough analysis of the Brexit situation, e. g. the reasons the previous British Prime-
Minister, David Cameron, decided to go ahead with the EU referendum in the first place, 
the ways the campaign developed and the role the British media played in it, as well as 
the effects this referendum is going to have on European and global politics, economy 
and society, will no doubt occupy social scientists for a long time to come.  
The whole membership of the UK in the EU has been based on this kind of ambivalence 
between being part of Europe and not being part of Europe, and it is not just a question 
of how British people saw their political community.  In Brexit it was a British people’s 
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ambivalence between the construction of the political community with a nostalgia 
towards empire and this has been important not just in the vote of the white working 
class people, but also of settled people who come from the ex-empire of the UK.  
Some of these ambivalences have a long history, which is shaped by colonial and 
commercial cosmopolitanism (Vieten 2007; 2012). Even before the EU referendum was 
on the horizon, there was an unease with some of the civic and political trajectories of 
Continental Europe which contradicted Britain’s primarily liberal market interests 
(ibid). Since the 1980s Thatcher and Reagan years, with liberal capitalism in power, and 
later on waiving in EU, austerity’, the idea of any social integration beyond mere 
economic integration of the European bloc has been a contested issue and limited to a 
large extent to a more left-wing route (Schiek 2012; 2016). 
Britain, as a longstanding ‘reluctant EU lover’ projected some of its post-2008 financial 
(economic) and social class (structural poverty) crisis as a failure of Europe and blaming 
EU institutions, regulations and the transnational ’Brussels’ elite: The rise of racist 
attacks in the aftermath of the June 2016 referendum, and the ‘special friendship’ 
intonation of some leading Westminster politicians appeasing to the New US 
governance style and their white Western supremacy tell a story of worse to come. 
In this chapter we are going to examine some of the ways Brexit embodies longer 
processes of the reconstruction of British citizenship. If T. H. Marshall (1950, 1975, 
1981) defined citizenship ‘as full membership in political communities’ which 
encompasses political, civil and social rights as well as responsibilities, we are seeing a 
process in which border guarding is added to citizenship responsibilities and the 
boundaries of the political community are being largely redrawn to those who hold 
British state citizenship rather than those members of civil societies who live in Britain 
and are holding a variety of EU and other state citizenships. This also signified a 
collapse of British multiculturalism policy and links into the wider context of the 
securitisation of visible religious minorities, e. g. Muslim communities, as will be 
explained later in the chapter. The overall argument here is that Brexit should be 
analysed in the context of people and governments’ reactions to what Nira Yuval-Davis 
calls elsewhere (2012) ‘the double crisis of governability and governmentality’. 
Particularly significant here are the turning of many traditional Labour voters, especially 
in North England, to vote UKIP (United Kingdom Independent Party; the party that 
called for Britain to leave the EU) and the fact that among those who voted for the UK 
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to leave the EU have been quite a few members of racialised minorities of settled 
immigrants, mostly from countries that used to be part of the British Empire. These two 
populist responses need to be seen on the background of the British 2014 & 2016 
Immigration Acts which, as Nira Yuval-Davis and her colleagues Georgia Wemyss and 
Kathryn Cassidy (2016) argue have established the technology of ‘everyday bordering’ 
as primary technology of controlling diversity and discourses on diversity, which is 
aimed to undermine convivial pluralist multi-cultural social relations which were the 
aim of previous technologies of control of British governments in previous decades. 
The structure of the chapter will be the following: 
Firstly, we explain briefly the double crisis which provides the structural background to 
contemporary forms of racialisation.  
Secondly, we turn to what Yuval-Davis et. Al. (2017, forthcoming) call ‘everyday 
bordering’, as a reactive government technology of control which in its turn is 
contributing, as well as being affected by, autochthonic political projects of belonging. 
These political projects of belonging, which we see as the predominant form of 
contemporary racialisations. In the conclusion, the chapter draws together the main 
arguments and the social and political dynamics of Brexit, also for the Island of Ireland. 
The double crisis 
Neo-liberal globalization emerged in a period of global optimism after the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the supposed victory (‘end of history’ to quote Fukuyama, 1992) of 
democracy, freedom and a mainstream discourse of a cosmopolitan world (e.g. Cheah 
et Al. 1998; Archibugi et. Al. 1998; Beck 2003; Beck & Grande 2007) in which social, 
national and state borders were on the wane. Less than twenty years later, we find 
ourselves in a world in which deregulation and globalization have been used to enhance 
global social inequalities, within as well as between societies’, and a deepening systemic 
signs of neoliberalism’s multi-faceted systemic global political and economic crisis, a 
crisis that is central to relationships between states and societies and to constructions of 
subjectivity and thus needs to be seen as a double related crisis of both governability 
and governmentality (Yuval-Davis, 2012). Now what do we mean by this double crisis 
of governability and governmentality?  When we are talking about globalisation, we are 
not talking just about globalisation; we are talking about neo-liberal globalisation.  What 
we see in this new liberal globalisation means that power and the accumulation of 
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resources of the biggest multinational corporations are more than ten times altogether 
the accumulated resources that all states in the world have altogether (e.g. Cohen 2007; 
also see Guardian Panel on Capitalism, 16.4.12, link?). This means that the relative 
power of governments to govern, rather than to negotiate their powers with the interest 
of multinationals has become weaker. Moreover, as a result of that and privatisation of 
the welfare state has been part and parcel, not just of the welfare part.  We know even 
that the prison service and part of the military even are being privatised (e.g. Pattison, 
2010) So as a result of that and we saw it very clearly at the crisis in 2008 with the 
banking crisis, there is such entanglement between the private sphere and the public 
sphere, that there is no way that one can claim the public sphere without for example 
salvaging the banks, otherwise the public sphere would have been collapsing.  While 
the European Union provides an alternative form of multi-level and supranational 
governance (Sweet & Sandholtz 1997) its applicability and advocacy in different EU 
countries has been shrinking for decades (Eichenberg & Dalton 2007). Benhabib (2004, 
13) has pointed out more than 12 years ago that ‘the EU is caught in contradictory 
currents which move it towards norms of cosmopolitan justice in the treatment of those 
who are within its boundaries, while leading it to act in accordance with outmoded 
Westphalian conceptions of unbridled sovereignty toward those who are on the 
outside…‘the negotiation between insider and outsider status has become tense and 
almost warlike.’  
This contradictory road of the European project itself in terms of normative frames, lack 
of legal cohesion and social inclusion has helped to undermine the EU’s claim of good 
governance. (See also Schierup & et. Al., 2006)  
The results of the UK EU referendum in June 2016 has shown how the distrust of the 
EU brought a majority of the population across the UK, to vote to leave the EU. 
Northern Ireland and Scotland voted differently than the majority of people in England 
and Wales and the regional divisions highlighted by this distinctive view might also 
pose new frictions to the concept and claim of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, in the near future. Consolidating the popular vote of BREXIT in June 
2016, the parliamentary backing by a majority of MPs in the House of Commons on the 
1st of February, means the UK government can go ahead triggering Art. 50 of Lisbon 
Treaty.i However, through the rejection of a future political alliance with Europe and 
the project of regional governance and polity integration, the UK enters a new stage of 
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insecurity and changed policy identifications, including new challenges to 
governmentality.  
The 2008 economic crisis has shown that the growing entanglement and dependency 
not only of local and global markets but also of local private and public institutions has 
meant that various states have been forced to bail out banks and large corporations for 
fear of total economic collapse; even though the capacity of state agencies to enforce 
regulation on that same private sector is extremely limited. In the post-2008 
international banking crisis debates, the slogan ‘profits are privatised, and debts 
socialized’ii went viral. 
As Richard Murphy (2011) and others have pointed out, as a result of state policies of 
deregulation, and the increasing privatisation of the state (including the many forms of 
so-called public-private partnership), in many cases it is no longer easy to draw a clear 
differentiation between the public and the private. Whole locations and domains which 
used to be part of public space - from schools to shopping areas - are no longer public, 
but are rather owned by, or leased for a very long period to, a private company or 
consortium of companies. The shift from a civic and political notion of citizenship to 
that of a citizen as a consumer (Bauman 2007) has been silent, but effective. For 
example, you get compensation if the train is late for three hours, but you don’t have a 
say whether the train should be privatised or not. Though you only get the compensation 
if acting assertively, or otherwise having the financial means to go to court and trial the 
privatised train companies. London, and the planning and delivery of the Olympics 
2012, is a case in point: Richard Murphy (2011) and others developed the notion of 
contract capitalism; in the end, the decisions how to run the Olympics were privatised. 
In preparation of the 2012 London Olympics there were about a hundred-and-forty 
contractors engaged, further outsourcing their delivery to other contractors. So any issue 
around there, for example, appropriation of public, what people thought that they were 
the common or public sphere, were not anymore part of the public debate because it was 
part of the contract with particular private companies. Moreover, since the 1990s, the 
proportion of global assets that are in foreign ownership continue to rise. Furthermore, 
the sphere that is regarded as part of ‘national security’, and thus as off limits for foreign 
ownership, is also continuously shrinking. A French company now owns a British 
energy company, the Chinese are building its nuclear power station and British airports 
are owned by a Spanish company. As Will Hutton (2012) pointed out in a Guardian 
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public debate (Guardian Panel on Capitalism, 16.4.12; see also the Independent, ‘Who 
Owns Britain: Watchdog launches first UK stock-take’, 15.5.10.), states are becoming 
small fry in comparison with international markets. The GDPs of all the states in the 
globe when added together total about 70 trillion dollars, while the total amount of 
money circulating in the global financial markets is between 600 and 700 trillion. 
But this is not simply a matter of statistics and numbers. Or, to put it differently, this 
quantitative phenomenon is simply one aspect - though a very significant one - of the 
problems that result from the basic legal relationship that pertains between corporations 
and states, whereby companies have the status of fictional citizens which enables the 
people who run them - through their ‘Ltd’ affix - to escape responsibility for the results 
of their corporations’ actions, while retaining their ability to control the funds. In this 
era of increasing globalisation, the ability on the part of companies - and the people who 
run them - to change locations, base themselves in tax havens, and escape having to bear 
the social, economic, environmental and other consequences of their actions, is 
becoming ever clearer - in the Global North as well as the Global South; and the rhetoric 
of governments on budget days has very little impact on their activities. Moreover, while 
states have been forced to bail out banks to avoid major economic collapse (given the 
growing lack of differentiation between private and public financial sectors), states 
themselves - such as Greece, Ireland and others - have found themselves forced to cut 
their own budgets severely, against the interests of their citizens.  
Thus, the crisis of governability is a result of the fact that in the time of neo-liberal 
globalisation, governments cannot anymore primarily represent the interests of their 
citizens. The crisis of governmentality follows this crisis of governability, because when 
people feel that their interests are not pursued by their governments – even the most 
radical ones, like in Greece – they feel disempowered and deprived. After a while they 
also stop buying the neo-liberal ideology which tells them that it is their responsibility 
if they fail to be healthy and wealthy, to provide for their families and become part of 
the incredibly rich and famous. Saskia Sassen (2015) has argued that, as a result of 
neoliberal globalisation, rather than experiencing an overall weakening the liberal state 
has changed internally: executive powers have strengthened at the expense of legislative 
branches. This is partly as a direct result of the privatisation of the state, whereby a 
substantial number of the regulative tasks of the legislature have been lost; and it is 
partly because it is the executive branch that virtually exclusively negotiates with other 
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national and supranational governance executives (such as the EU, the UN, the World 
Bank, the World Trade Organisation), and with private, national and especially 
transnational corporations. 
This is an important observation, which offers some explanation of the governmentality 
crisis: because of the increasing power of the executive, there is growing 
disenchantment and alienation from the state on the part of citizens, who accordingly 
begin to refrain from internalising and complying with the neoliberal state’s 
technologies of governance. This disenchantment is particularly important in countries 
where voting in national elections is solely for the election of members of parliament, 
rather than also for the head of the executive (although, as the recent local elections in 
the UK and Germany have shown, it can be evident there as well). At the same time, in 
parliamentary democracies the right to rule the state is dependent on formal 
endorsement by the electorate of particular parties; this is what gives the state 
legitimacy. Hence the growing worry of governments at the lack of involvement of the 
electorate in these processes.  
The growing securitisation and militarisation of the liberal state is directly related to the 
fear within ruling elites that arises from this crisis of governmentality. The forms of 
resistance to this crisis, however, vary widely - depending on people’s intersected 
positionings, identifications and normative values: they can be more or less violent, 
more or less radical, more or less guided by primordial as opposed to cosmopolitan 
value systems. 
This is the time in which it becomes very easy to shift responsibility to those who ‘do 
not belong’ – the migrants or anyone else who have different look, accent, culture and 
religion.  
On this background, those of us who have been working on issues of racism, nationalism 
and ethnic relations, find ourselves with new challenges with the combined emergence 
of everyday bordering as a technology of control of diversity and discourses on diversity 
and autochthonic populist politics of belonging in a growing number of places on the 
globe, to produce new forms of intersectional racist practices. 
 
Everyday bordering 
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Barth (1998) and others following him, have argued that it is the existence of ethnic 
(and racial) boundaries, rather than of any specific ‘essence’ around which these 
boundaries are constructed that are crucial in processes of ethnocisation and 
racialisation. Any physical or social signifier can be used to construct the boundaries 
which differentiate between ‘us’ and ‘them’.  
The Irish 2004 Citizenship referendum, for example, changed ius soli (the republican 
territorial notion) to ius sanguinis (the ethno-national notion), and opened the door 
ideologically to endorse this form of ethno-national boundary drawing.  
The situation in Northern Ireland is different though to a state focused ethno-national 
imagination as the ongoing political division into two as distinctively perceived ethno-
national-religious groups (e.g. The Catholic/Republican; the Protestant/ Loyalists) 
means that there is not (yet) an established imagination of one cohesive and uniting 
political community that constructs itself against the Other. Sectarianism (see for details 
Bell & McVeigh, 2016) and the political framework of consociationalism (McGarry & 
Leary, 2006; see for a critical comparative debate Angelov, 2004)iii shape how everyday 
life as well as policy and governance is organised in Northern Ireland. This is not to say 
that racialising of Others, and hate crimes (Jarman & Monagh 2003) are not an issue; 
‘othering’, however, rather has to be seen and analysed differently as there is an Other 
historically constructed and established in the visibility of the ‘other’ Christian’ ethno-
national collective in the Northern Irish societyiv.  
Current post-Brexit debates on the Isle of Ireland asking among others, for a special 
status of NI, the January 2017 collapse of the Stormont two party- sharing system (DUP/ 
Arlene Foster and Sinn Fèin/ Martin McGuinness)v, but also the ways new generations, 
‘shared’ education and further processes of normalisation will affect living together of 
different communities, might change notions of citizenship and national boundary 
drawing, in future. 
Alongside this form of a sectarian state of society, usually, state borders are but one of 
the technologies, used to construct and maintain imagined political community 
boundaries.  
It is for this reason that contemporary border studies largely refer to ‘borderings’ rather 
than to borders, seeing them more as a dynamic, shifting and contested social and 
political spatial processes linked to particular political projects rather than just territorial 
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lines (Houtum & Et. al., 2005). However, these borders and boundaries are not just a 
top-down macro social and state policies but are present in everyday discourses and 
practices of different social agents, from state functionaries to the media to all other 
differentially positioned members of society (Yuval-Davis et Al. ., 2017 forthcoming).  
Everyday bordering has been developing a technology of control of diversity by 
governments which have been seeking to supposedly reassert control over the 
composition and security of the population. Instead of borders being on the point of 
moving from one state to another, borders have now spread to be everywhere. All 
citizens are required to become untrained unpaid border guards, and more and more of 
us are becoming suspects as illegal, or at least illegitimate border crossers. This has been 
a tendency that developed for quite a few years, probably since 9/11 if not before, but 
the 2014 and 2016 immigration Acts have clinched this. Now, every landlord, every 
employer, every teacher, every doctor, is responsible to verify that her or his tenants, 
employees, students, patients, are legally in the country and if they fail, they are legally 
responsible and might even go to prison for failing to do so (unlike those who are trained 
and paid to do this job). These UK Immigration Acts counteract the power devolution 
in Northern Ireland (and Scotland) in everyday lives.  
In 1998, and with the Good Friday Peace Agreement, Northern Ireland became a 
devolved constituent region of the UK, and the devolved legislature of the Northern 
Ireland Assembly was established. Though constitutional and security issues are under 
the control of the Northern Ireland Office, the OFMDFM (Office of the First Minister 
and Deputy First Minister) and, for example, information about the number of asylum 
seekers arriving on the shore of Ireland, are under direct control of the Home Office. In 
effect, national security and border control are excepted matters of the central 
government in London (Westminster) which can produce tensions with the devolved 
matters of for example ‘housing, health, education and employment’. Immigration 
control as an excepted matter complicates the role of governance and policy making for 
the Northern Ireland Executive. Following the Immigration Act 2016 the private rented 
sector actors are regarded as agents of immigration control. The consequences of this 
being that an immigration measure becomes a housing measure, as well as a licensing, 
social care and labour market measure. (Murphy & Vieten, 2017)  
Thus, from a convivial multi-cultural diverse society this technology of control is 
breeding suspicion, fear and sensitisation of the boundaries between those who belong 
10     
 
and those who do not. Brexit has only enhanced this sense of differentiation and 
hierarchization among people. 
Autochthonic politics of belonging 
Peter Geschiere (2009) defined autochthonic politics as the global return to the local. It 
relates to a kind of racialisation that has gained new impetus under globalization and 
mass immigration and can be seen as a form of temporal-territorial racialization, of 
exclusion and inferiorization, that are the outcome of the relative new presence of 
particular people and collectivities in particular places (neighbourhood, region or 
country). The Greek word ‘autochthony’ (=to be of the soil) is used in the Netherlands 
and in the Francophone world, where the crucial difference is between the 
‘autochthones’ who belong and the ‘allochthones’ who do not 
Geschiere (ibid: 21–2) rightly claims that ‘autochthony’ can be seen as a new phase of 
ethnicity, although in some sense it even surpasses ethnicity (see also Yuval-Davis, 
2011). While ethnicity is highly constructed, relationally and situationally 
circumscribed, there are limits to these reconstructions regarding name and history. 
Autochthony is a much more ‘empty’ and thus elastic notion. It states no more than ‘I 
was here before you’ and, as such, can be applied in any situation and can be constantly 
redefined and applied to different groupings in different ways. It combines elements of 
naturalization of belonging with vagueness as to what constitutes the essence of 
belonging, and thus can be pursued also by groups which would not necessarily be 
thought to be autochthone by others. The notion of autochthonic politics of belonging 
is very important when we come to understand contemporary populist extreme right 
politics in Europe and elsewhere. The people who follow these politics continuously 
argue that they are ‘not racist’, although they are very much against all those who ‘do 
not belong’. As far as a pan-European discourse of far-right racist populism is concerned 
the national-territorial notion of autochthony adopts also another layer of trans-national 
culturalism; a myth of European ‘Christian cultural heritage’ (Vieten, 2016: 624). For 
example, in the Dutch context the social categories of ‘autochthon - allochthon’ framedvi 
policy, academic research and political debates since the 1970s, and by doing so 
racialise(d) (Yanow & Van der Haar 2013; Essed & Hoving 2014; Jones 2014; Vieten 
2016) post-colonial visible minorities as well as migrant newcomers to the society, 
particularly Surinamese-Dutch and Moroccan-Dutch. In some cases, such as in the case 
of the English Defence League in the UK, the organization has formally both Jewish 
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and Gay sections, as well as Hindu, Sikh and Afro-Caribbean supporters, something 
unimaginable in the older kind of extreme right organizations with neo-Nazi ideologies. 
Geert Wilders and the Dutch PVV (Freedom Party) also have been noticeable for a 
‘pseudo’ advocacy of women and gay rights (Vieten 2016). In France, Marine Le Pen 
who is the current leader of Front National, originally led by her father, goes to great 
lengths to deny that her party is racist, anti-Semitic or homophobic. Marine Le Pen 
claims that ‘the right-left divide makes no sense anymore. Now the real division is 
between nationalism and globalisation’. Thus, she warns of the ‘dilution’ and ‘wiping 
out’ of the French nation and civilisation, under threat from ‘never-ending queues of 
foreigners’ (interview in the Guardian, 2011).  
Autochthonic politics of belonging can take very different forms in different countries 
and can be reconfigured constantly also in the same places. Nevertheless, like any other 
forms of racialization and other boundary constructions, their discourses always appear 
to express self-evident or even ‘natural’ emotions and desires: the protection of ancestral 
heritage, the fear of being contaminated by foreign influences, and so on, although they 
often hide very different notions of ancestry and contamination. 
Brexit, everyday bordering and autochthonic politics of belonging 
As described above, both everyday bordering and autochthonic populist politics can be 
seen as forms of racialisation. The process of racialisation involves discourses and 
practices which construct immutable boundaries between homogenized and reified 
collectivities. These boundaries are used to naturalize fixed hierarchical power relations 
between these collectivities. Any signifier of boundaries can be used to construct these 
boundaries, from the colour of the skin to the shape of the elbow, to accent or mode of 
dress. (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Murji & Solomos, 2005). 
Racialisations have ultimately two logics – that of exclusion, the ultimate form of which 
is genocide, and that of exploitation the ultimate logic of which is slavery. However, in 
most concrete historical situations these two logics are practiced in a complementary 
way. Since the 1980s there has been a lot of discussion on the rise of what Barker (1982) 
called ‘the new racism’ and Balibar (2005) ‘racisme differentialiste’. Unlike the ‘old’ 
racism, the focus of these kinds of racialization discourses focused not on notions of 
‘races’ or of other kinds of different ethnic origins, but on different cultures, religions 
and traditions which were seen as threatening to ‘contaminate’ or ‘overwhelm’ the 
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cultural ‘essence’ of ‘the nation’. It links to what Ghorashi (2007; 2010) calls 
‘culturalism’, or Vieten calls ‘gendered culturalism’ (Vieten 2016). 
Everyday bordering links racialisation formally to citizenship status, but underlying this 
is a mythical nostalgic imaginary in which all citizens are members of the nation, and 
the boundaries of civil society overlap the boundaries of the nation as well as the state. 
This is the same logic as that of autochthonic populism in which only those who 
‘belong’ should have access to state and other social, economic and political resources.  
These forms of racialisation exist in the context of neo-liberal globalisation and ‘the age 
of migration’, in which a variety of ethnic and racial communities have migrated and 
settled, constructing pluralist multicultural societies and citizenships. This is especially 
true, of course, in the context of the EU, but has also characterised the relationship of 
Ireland and the UK for a much longer period. It is for this reason that many 
contemporary populist imaginaries, as we have seen above, have incorporated some of 
this social heterogeneity as long as that social heterogeneity does not threaten 
hegemonic political projects of belonging and thus, they can claim of ‘not being racist’. 
Indeed, David Goldberg (2015), has linked the spread of the ‘postracial society’ notion 
as the logic and condition that enables racism to persist and proliferate. 
Conclusion 
This paper has argued that that Brexit should be analysed in the context of people and 
governments’ reactions to ‘the double crisis of governability and governmentality’ 
(Yuval-Davis 2012). Geschiere’s (2009) claim that the concept of ‘autochthony’ 
characterises a new phase of community boundary drawing complementing  the concept 
of ethnicity is applied to the UK context, and further illustrated while discussing some 
relevant emanations of this development and also distinctions as far as Northern Ireland, 
the Netherlands and France, for example, are concerned. The 2016 election of the US 
president Trump, and his country-selective ban of Muslim immigrants and refugees 
entering the US, adds another layer of complexity to this autochthonic political of 
belonging as it is evolving. 
It is for this reason of a shifting project of autochthonic politics of belonging that some 
members of racialised minorities who have settled in the UK, especially those who 
arrived before the 1981 Nationality Act and were, as coming from countries that used 
to be part of the British Empire. Back then they were entitled for automatic right to settle 
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and gain UK citizenship. This identification and feeling of belonging to the UK might 
have influences some to vote for Brexit, feeling that in the Brexit political project of 
belonging they can belong more than in the EU political project, in which they saw 
themselves as racialised outsiders.(Vieten 2018, forthcoming)  They could thus join the 
Brexit autochthonic political project of belonging. Many of them, of course, were 
bitterly disappointed, with the sharp rise of racist attacks after Brexit towards all 
racialised minorities. 
The motivation of some members of settled racialised minorities in the UK to vote for 
Brexit is just one particular situated motivations that brought people to vote for Brexit 
from different sections of British society and this is why a situated intersectional 
analysis (Yuval-Davis, 2014; but see also Crenshaw, 1991; Vieten 2009; Lutz & al, 
2011; Hill-Collins & Bilge, 2016) is so central in examining social, political, cultural 
and economic relations. However, the overall implications regarding the effect of Brexit 
on the relationships between identity, citizenship and the state, has been to highlight and 
sensitise the boundaries of national citizenship and belonging, excluding all those 
sections of society who do not carry British passport as well as those the racist 
imagination would like not to be entitled to.  
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